Do large datasets provide value to psychologists? Without a systematic methodology for working with such datasets, there is a valid concern that analyses will produce noise artifacts rather than true effects. In this paper, we offer a way to enable researchers to systematically build models and identify novel phenomena in large datasets. One traditional approach is to analyze the residuals of models-the biggest errors they make in predicting the data-to discover what might be missing from those models. However, once a dataset is sufficiently large, machine learning algorithms approximate the true underlying function better than the data, suggesting instead that the predictions of these data-driven models should be used to guide model-building. We call this approach "Scientific Regret Minimization" (SRM) as it focuses on minimizing errors for cases that we know should have been predictable. We demonstrate this methodology on a subset of the Moral Machine dataset, a public collection of roughly forty million moral decisions. Using SRM, we found that incorporating a set of deontological principles that capture dimensions along which groups of agents can vary (e.g. sex and age) improves a computational model of human moral judgment. Furthermore, we were able to identify and independently validate three interesting moral phenomena: criminal dehumanization, age of responsibility, and asymmetric notions of responsibility.
Introduction
The standard methodology in psychological research is to identify a real-world behavior, create a laboratory paradigm that can induce that behavior, and then test a variety of hypotheses on a group of participants. This methodology was first pioneered over one hundred years ago and remains the de facto approach today. While it enables researchers to dissociate individual variables of interest, it can also lead to over-fixation on a specific paradigm and the small amount of variations it offers in contrast to more broadly sampling the space of experiments relevant to the behavior of interest. As a result, several researchers have started to call for a shift towards mining massive online datasets via crowdsourced experiments (Griffiths, 2015; Jones, 2016; Goldstone & Lupyan, 2016; McAbee, Landis, & Burke, 2017; Paxton & Griffiths, 2017; Schulz et al., 2019) because the scale offered by the internet enables scientists to quickly evaluate thousands of hypotheses on millions of participants.
The Moral Machine experiment is one recent example of a large-scale online study. Modeled after the trolley car dilemma (Foot, 1967; Thomson, 1984; Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001) , this paradigm asks participants to indicate how autonomous cars should act when forced to make life-and-death decisions. In particular, participants were presented with two types of dilemmas: pedestrians vs. pedestrians, in which an empty car must choose between killing two sets of pedestrians (see Figure 1) , and passengers vs.
pedestrians, in which a car must choose between saving its passengers or a group of pedestrians.
The Moral Machine experiment collected roughly forty million decisions from individuals in over two hundred countries, making it the largest moral reasoning experiment ever conducted. In addition to the vast number of judgments collected, the experiment operated over a rich problem space: the many possible combinations of twenty different types of agents (e.g., man, girl, female doctor, dog) as well as contextual information (position of the car, crossing signal) resulted in millions of unique dilemmas being presented to participants. With all these variations, the SCIENTIFIC REGRET MINIMIZATION 4 Figure 1 . A sample moral dilemma using the Moral Machine paradigm . Here, the participant must choose whether the car should stay and kill a girl, old woman and a dog, who are all illegally crossing, or whether the car should swerve and kill an infant, a woman, and a dog, who are all legally crossing. question thus becomes: for any given dilemma, do participants prefer the car to stay or swerve?
Furthermore, what factors influence each decision?
Psychologists have developed a standard statistical approach for analyzing behavioral data to answer such questions: identify all the possible predictors for an individual's decision and fit a model using these predictors. By analyzing the statistical significance of each predictor or an overall model metric that penalizes complexity (e.g., the Akaike information criterion (Akaike, 1998) ), the researcher finds a model that best trades off model complexity with accuracy.
Unfortunately, this approach does not scale well with large datasets. Statistical significance is achieved with lower effect sizes in large samples, and complexity penalties are dominated by SCIENTIFIC REGRET MINIMIZATION 5 measures of fit such as the log-likelihood. As a result, when the dataset is sufficiently large, this approach will always favor the more complex model even if the increase in predictive accuracy per data point is trivial. An even stronger critique of this approach is that it assumes prior knowledge of the relevant predictors. In the Moral Machine dataset, the question is not just how important the different factors might be to making moral judgments, but what these factors are to begin with. One may try to test all possible interactions, but there can easily be an exponential blowup in the number of parameters, reducing the interpretability and thus the explanatory power of the model. For example, a naïve featurization of the Moral Machine dataset results in more than 11,000 three-way interactions. Given that the Moral Machine dataset allows forty-way interactions and the relevant predictors may be complex nonlinear functions of the lower-level features, this approach would be difficult to implement in practice. What is needed is an efficient and systematic way of analyzing large datasets to identify interesting behaviors and the features that give rise to them.
Understanding the Moral Machine dataset in this manner is simply a microcosm of the broader scientific enterprise. Consider a scientist interested in moral psychology. How does she contribute to the field? She reads papers and combines that knowledge with her own personal experiences, building an internal model that can predict behaviors in different settings. In parallel, she reads the scientific literature to find models that explain these effects. Then, by analyzing the differences between her own mental model and the literature, she either proposes an explanation for a known phenomenon or hypothesizes a novel effect. She conducts an experiment that evaluates her claim and continues this scientific process again.
We believe large datasets should be tackled in the same way, and we formalize this intuition in a process we call "Scientific Regret Minimization" (SRM), by analogy to the notion of regret minimization in machine learning (Lai & Robbins, 1985) . First, we suggest that researchers should leverage the size of large datasets to train theoretically-unconstrained machine learning models to identify the amount of variance in the dataset that can be explained (Khajah, Lindsey, & Mozer, 2016; Peysakhovich & Naecker, 2017; Kleinberg, Liang, & Mullainathan, 2017;  SCIENTIFIC REGRET MINIMIZATION 6 Figure 2. Scientific Regret Minimization. After collecting a large dataset, we use machine learning models to separate the signal from the noise. We then critique psychological models with respect to the signal identified by the machine learning model and continue doing so until both of the models converge. Fudenberg & Liang, 2019; Glaser, Benjamin, Farhoodi, & Kording, 2019) . Next, because these models do not necessarily give insight to the underlying cognitive processes, a simple and interpretable psychological model should be trained on the same dataset. Researchers should then critique the psychological model with respect to the black-box model rather than the data. The intuition here is that the psychological model should only be penalized for incorrectly predicting phenomena that are predictable (i.e. we should pay close attention to those errors that result in regret). This critiquing process should continue until the predictions of both models converge, SCIENTIFIC REGRET MINIMIZATION 7 thereby ending with a model that jointly maximizes predictive and explanatory power. The residuals from this process may correspond to novel effects, and one can run separate experiments that independently validate them. A summary of this approach is outlined in Figure 2 .
The method of refining models by analyzing their errors (also known as "residuals") is often employed in scientific modeling (Box & Hunter, 1962; Blei, 2014; Linderman & Gershman, 2017) . In this paradigm, researchers begin by proposing a model and fitting it to the data. By looking at the inputs where the model's predictions and the data diverge, they attempt to identify new relevant features that will hopefully increase the model's accuracy. They then incorporate these new features into the model, fit it to the data, and continue repeating the process. Our approach is different because we suggest that, once the dataset is sufficiently large, models should be critiqued with respect to a powerfully predictive model rather than the data. Critiquing with respect to the data in large datasets can be difficult because the top residuals often reflect noise.
Formally, let f (x) be the true function we are trying to understand, and let the data be y = f (x) + , where ∼ N (0, σ 2 ). Furthermore, let us assume we are trying to predict the data with a psychological model g (x) . The expected squared residual between the psychological model and the data is
That is, the expected residual between the model and the data, y − g(x), will be the true residual, 
The latter two terms in the right-hand expression correspond to the covariance of the predictive and psychological models' errors, and the generalization error of the predictive model. For these residuals to be more highly correlated with the true residuals than the residuals from the data, we
Because the generalization error of data-driven machine learning algorithms decreases with the amount of the data with with they are trained (Huang et al., 2018) , this inequality will hold when the dataset is sufficiently large. Once this condition is met, we should critique the psychological model with respect to the machine learning model rather than the dataset. Figure 3 demonstrates an example of how the residuals between a neural network and a simple linear model become more representative of the true residuals than the residuals between the data and the linear model.
In this paper, we apply Scientific Regret Minimization to the Moral Machine dataset. We demonstrate that a multilayer feedfoward neural network outperforms simple psychological choice models for predicting people's decisions, and we then continuously critique a rational choice model until its predictive accuracy rivals that of the neural network. The result is an informative, interpretable psychological theory that identifies a set of moral principles that inform people's judgments -exactly the kind of insight that is relevant to informing policy around new technologies such as autonomous vehicles. This process also allowed us to identify three subtle and complex moral phenomena, which we validated by running preregistered experiments. Our end product is (1) a computational model of moral judgment that jointly maximizes explanatory and predictive power as well as (2) the identification and replication of several principles behind human moral reasoning.
Results

Computational Modeling
Formalization. Scientific Regret Minimization first calls for identifying a paradigm of interest and then critiquing a simple and interpretable cognitive model with respect to a data-driven predictive model. We restricted ourselves to the subset of the Moral Machine dataset that contained pedestrians vs. pedestrians dilemmas (N = 15,226,477) . We used a rational choice model (Luce, 1959; McFadden, 1973 ) as our cognitive model to explain human moral judgment, SCIENTIFIC REGRET MINIMIZATION 10 assuming that, in the Moral Machine paradigm, humans constructed values for both sides of pedestrians (i.e., v left and v right ) and saved the side with the higher value. Each side's value was determined by aggregating the utilities of its agents:
in which u i was the utility given to every agent type i (e.g., man, girl, female doctor, dog), and l i represents the number of those agents on that side. This formalization offers that a participant's choice c obeys the softmax choice rule, which states that participants chose to save a side in the following way:
We implemented this rule by fitting a logistic regression model to the data in order to infer the utility vector u. Initially, we ran three models with differing sets of constraints on this utility
vector. The first model, 'Equal Weight,' required all twenty agents to have the same weight (i.e.
we set u = k1 and inferred the constant k). On the other extreme, we built a 'Utilitarian' model that had no constraints on the utility vector. The third model, 'Animals vs. People,' was a hybrid that allowed different weights for humans and animals, but had the constraint that all humans were weighted equally and all animals were weighted equally.
These three models did not incorporate the main inspiration behind the trolley car dilemma: a resistance to intervening and thus killing bystanders, which is not justified by utilitarian calculus. In order to incorporate such deontological principles, we expanded the definition of the value of a side:
in which λ m refers to the value of principle m and f m is a binary variable indicating whether that principle was relevant to the given side. We used this formalization to build a fourth model, which we called 'Expanded,' and proposed that two potential principles were relevant in the Moral Machine paradigm. The first was that a side was penalized if saving it required the participant to swerve. This penalty has been the primary focus of many moral psychology experiments based on SCIENTIFIC REGRET MINIMIZATION 11 the trolley car dilemma (Greene et al., 2001; Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004; Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006) . Second, because the Moral Machine dataset had three different crossing signal statuses (crossing legally, crossing illegally, and the absence of a crossing signal) we added a penalty if a side's pedestrians were crossing illegally. This side might have been penalized by participants because the participants were waiving their rights to protection by violating the law (Nino, 1983) , and participants may have preferred to kill the pedestrians whose rights have been waived. We used logistic regression to infer the values of u and λ.
In addition to training these choice models, we also built a standard multilayer feedforward neural network. This network had forty-two inputs: twenty corresponding to the agents on the left, twenty for the agents on the right, one for the car side, and one for the crossing signal status, thus completely specifying the given dilemma. (It should be noted that one variable for the crossing signal status of the left-hand side is sufficient because the crossing signal status of the right-hand side is just the opposite). These inputs were the same as the 'Expanded' model, except that the 'Expanded' model had the added constraint that the value of an agent was constant across both sides (i.e., a girl on the left side was just as valuable as a girl on the right side), while the neural network had no restriction.
Initial Results. The top panel of Figure 4 reports the results of training all the models on differently-sized subsets of the data. Each model was trained on eighty percent of the subsets, and the metrics here reflect the results when tested on the held-out twenty percent. We report accuracy and area under the curve (AUC), two commonly used metrics in evaluating models of binary decisions. Furthermore, we also calculated the normalized Akaike information criterion (AIC), a metric in which a smaller number suggests a better model (Akaike, 1998) .
In this training, the rational choice models performed extremely well at small sizes, and their performance stayed relatively consistent as the dataset size increased. On the other hand, the neural network performed poorly at small sizes, but became better with larger ones and eventually surpassed the choice models. Furthermore, it should be noted that the Neural Network had a better AIC than the Expanded model despite the fact the former had over three thousand parameters while the latter only had twenty-two. This result affirms our earlier point that metrics like the AIC become uninformative, reducing to a measure of the log-likelihood, when the dataset is sufficiently large. Most importantly, though, the neural network's eventual performance suggested there were systematic effects that our choice models were predicting incorrectly. We leveraged these residuals via SRM to build a better choice model of human moral judgment.
Improving the Model
Identifying Axes of Differences. The standard methodology for critiquing models suggests calculating residuals from the data, and Table 1 reports the five largest of these with a minimum sample size of one hundred participants. We claim that the residuals for these dilemmas may often reflect noise and that the neural network's predictions are more representative of the true function than the data. For example, in the top residual between the data and the choice SCIENTIFIC REGRET MINIMIZATION 13 model, a car is headed towards a group of four humans (a man, a woman, a girl, and a male executive). On the other side is a dog and three cats. According to the data, over 99% of the 649 participants in this dilemma stayed in the lane and chose to kill the humans instead of the animals.
The choice model predicted a strong effect in the opposite direction, and this prediction was reasonably close to the neural network's prediction, suggesting that the choice model may not be mispredicting here. To confirm this, we looked at the dilemmas that followed these conditions:
the car was headed towards agents that were comprised of men, women, girls, male executives, or any combination of them; the other side comprised of dogs and/or cats; there was an absence of a crossing signal; the number of agents on each side were identical; and at least fifty participants responded to the dilemma. There were forty-five such dilemmas. In forty-four of these forty-five dilemmas, only 11.3% to 25.5% of participants chose to kill the side with humans. The forty-fifth dilemma was the one with the top residual, and here 99.4% of participants chose to kill the human side. The results of the forty-four other dilemmas suggest that the data for this dilemma is noisy, and thus we shouldn't critique the choice model for disagreeing with the data here.
Similarly, consider the second top residual. Here, a car is headed towards an old woman and a pregnant woman, who are crossing illegally. On the other side is a dog and cat crossing legally. Both the data and the neural network predicted participants would not kill the humans.
However, the magnitudes were drastically different, and the correct magnitude is needed to understand the priority of this residual. In the data, only 5.1% of the 924 participants killed the humans, while the neural network predicted 25.8% of participants would. Like above, we conducted an analysis of the data in similar dilemmas. We looked at dilemmas in which the car was headed towards agents that were either pregnant women, old women, or both; the pedestrians in front of the car were crossing illegally; on the other side of the car were animals; the number of agents on the left and right side were equivalent; and at least fifty people responded to the dilemma. In twelve of the thirteen dilemmas, 14.7% to 35.8% of participants chose to kill the side with humans. The thirteenth was the dilemma reflected here, and thus the data of similar dilemmas suggests the neural network's prediction is more accurate than the data. Therefore, SCIENTIFIC REGRET MINIMIZATION 14 while this dilemma exhibits a large residual for the choice model, the magnitude of the residual is overestimated when critiquing with respect to the data. Table 2 reports the largest residuals between the choice model and the neural network. We suggest that these residuals reflect the 'true residuals' better than the data. In these dilemmas, participants must decide whether the car should stay and kill the illegally crossing human or swerve and hit the legally crossing animal. Most participants chose to swerve, and the neural network correctly predicted this result. However, the 'Expanded' choice model often predicted the opposite. Looking at its coefficients, we can understand why: there was a penalty for both illegally crossing and swerving, and the sum of those penalties outweighed the utility differences between the human and the animal. We clustered those dilemmas as humans-versus-animal dilemmas, and it seemed that, in these instances, humans should be saved regardless of their crossing signal status and relationship to the side of the car. This represented a deontological principle, a moral rule independent of the consequences of the action (Alexander & Moore, 2016 animals, humans should be preferentially saved. This feature would have been difficult to justify when looking at the residuals from the data, because the top residual there actually exhibited a strong effect in the opposite direction. Going down the list of residuals, we are able to cluster another group of dilemmas with high errors and conducted a similar analysis shown in Supplementary Table S1 . Most salient to us in those dilemmas was an age gradient. Similar to above, future iterations of our model incorporated a deontological principle explicitly favoring the young in old-versus-young dilemmas. Furthermore, we added these axes as inputs into the neural network to create 'Neural Network +
Axes.' This model outperformed the original network at smaller dataset sizes but became seemingly identical at larger ones, suggesting that the original network could construct these axes once there was sufficient data. These axes were at least as complex as twenty-way interactions. A naïve approach in model-building would call for the addition of all two-and three-way interactions between the features, and yet these would still not formalize the principles we found.
Incorporating all feature interactions in a brute force manner (which would be necessary to discover the principles above) would result in an exponential blowup of parameters, and this number of parameters would dwarf that of the neural network.
Despite the initial success in increasing accuracy, the model-building process still displayed a potential for improvement (as indicated by the AUC curve), and thus we conducted more iterations of our loop. Using the residuals from the second iteration, we identified axes not explicitly manipulated by the researchers, such as Pregnant Women and Doctors versus other humans, and split previous axes into sub-axes (e.g., young versus old was split into young versus adult, adult versus old, and young versus old). The third and fourth iterations modeled two-way and three-way interactions between the axes of differences, the crossing signals, and the intervention status. Supplementary Table S2 ). The table also shows the maximum possible accuracy when using the aggregate data to predict the choice for every given dilemma via a table lookup algorithm (i.e. if 90% of participants in a given dilemma chose to swerve, the empirical prediction for that dilemma will be 90%; as a result, it should be noted that the performance of this 'model' was not calculated out-of-sample, while all the other models were). Supplementary Tables S3 to S8 report the residuals for the subsequent iterations. The features we identified at these later iterations reflect more subtle (and complicated) principles.
While there was conceptual overlap between the top neural network residuals and top data residuals for the first iteration, the gap seems to grow at the later iterations, in which the top data residuals seem to be very different than the top neural network residuals. 
Empirical Results
Model-building is exploratory and has the vulnerability of overfitting to the data. To evaluate this, we identified interesting effects from three iterations of SRM. First, regarding a new axis of difference, we found convincing evidence that participants excluded criminals from moral protections afforded to other human agents. We previously discussed the need to incorporate a deontological principle in humans-versus-animals dilemmas that prefers saving the human side.
While doing this helped the predictive power of our model overall, it also erred on a subclass of other dilemmas: criminals versus animals. In order to build a better model of human moral judgment, we had to explicitly remove the humans-versus-animals feature from these dilemmas and introduce a separate criminals-versus-animals feature, thus dehumanizing criminals in the eyes of our model.
Second, we were able to identify an intuitive interaction between kids and an illegal crossing status. Consider two dilemmas (illustrated in Supplementary Figure S1) where in the first, the participant must choose between saving an old woman or a girl and In the second, the participant must choose between saving either an old woman and a woman, or a girl and a woman. Rational choice models are based on a linear utility function and would consider these dilemmas to be treated equivalently, but the Moral Machine data and the neural network revealed that participants did not always do so. Rather, participants treated the dilemmas as equivalent when the side with children was crossing legally or if there was an absence of a crossing signal, but not when the side with children was illegally crossing. In the latter cases, the side with children in the second dilemma (i.e., with an adult) was penalized more than the corresponding side in the first dilemma.
Lastly, there was an intriguing asymmetric interaction between car side and crossing signal status in both male-versus-female dilemmas and fat-versus-fit dilemmas. Here, when the car was headed towards the higher-valued individual (i.e., the female or the athlete) in the absence of a crossing signal, the probability of saving the individual was roughly halfway between the probability of saving them when they were legally crossing and the probability of saving them when they were illegally crossing. However, this relationship did not hold when the car was headed towards the lower-valued individual. Rather, in those cases, the probability of saving the individual was significantly lower than the halfway point and close to the probability of saving them when they were illegally crossing. Intuitively, lower-valued individuals aren't given the "benefit of the doubt" when their crossing legality is ambiguous.
We ran three preregistered experiments on Amazon's Mechanical Turk in order to replicate and confirm these effects revealed by SRM.
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Experiment 1: Criminal Dehumanization
In this experiment, participants chose between saving a human and a dog. We varied the car side (dog, human), type of human (criminal, homeless man, old man, adult man), and crossing signal status (legally crossing, illegally crossing, N/A) for a total of twenty-four dilemmas. Each participant saw four of these twenty-four dilemmas. We calculated the percentage of participants that chose to save the human over the dog in every dilemma. For each car side and crossing signal combination, we conducted a Chi-squared test determining whether participants chose to save criminals less than each of the other three humans. This resulted in eighteen separate Chi-squared analyses, and for these eighteen analyses, criminals were saved at a rate between 11% to 28% less than the other human agents. All analyses were significant at the α = 0.05 level, and seventeen of the eighteen were significant at the α = 0.001 level. Graphical results are displayed in Figure 5 and tabular results are represented in Supplementary Table S9 . Figure 5 . Dehumanization of Criminals. When pitted against dogs, participants save criminals at a significantly lower rate that other human agents.
Experiment 2: Age of Responsibility
In this experiment, participants either chose between saving a child or an old adult or they chose between saving a child and an adult versus an old adult and an adult. We varied car side SCIENTIFIC REGRET MINIMIZATION 20 (child, old adult), crossing signal condition (legally crossing, illegally crossing, N/A), and sex (male, female) for a total of twenty-four stimuli. Each participant saw six of the twenty-four dilemmas. We aggregated responses for all dilemmas in order to calculate the percentage of participants that chose to save the young side. For each car side, sex, and crossing signal combination, we conducted a Chi-squared analysis comparing the percentage that saved the young side in a child versus old adult dilemma to the percentage that saved the young side in a child and adult versus old adult and adult dilemma. Of these twelve analyses, we hypothesized four would be significant at the α = 0.05 level while the other eight would not be. Specifically, we hypothesized that the analyses where the young side was crossing illegally would be significantly different but that the dilemmas in the other crossing signal conditions would not be.
Three of the four hypothesized significant effects were significant at the α = 0.05 level, while seven of the eight hypothesized null effects were not significant at the α = 0.05 level. Results are graphically represented in Figure 6 and reported in Supplementary Table S10 .
Experiment 3: Asymmetric Notions of Responsibility
Each dilemma in this experiment was either a male versus female or an athlete versus a large person. We varied car side and crossing signal status, as well as age (adult, old) for the male-female dilemmas and sex for the fat-fit dilemmas, for a total of twenty-four dilemmas. Each participant only saw four of the twenty-four possible dilemmas. For each axis (i.e., male-female or fat-fit) and car side combination, we conducted a Chi-squared analysis comparing the percentage that saved the higher-valued individual in the absence of a crossing signal to the average of the percentages that saved in the legal and illegal crossing settings. We hypothesized that when the car was headed towards the lower-valued individuals, the proportion saved in the absence of a crossing signal condition would be significantly less than the mean of the other two crossing signal settings, while we did not think there would be a significant difference when the car was headed towards the higher-valued individuals. All four of our hypothesized significant effects were significant at the α = 0.05 level and all four of our hypothesized null effects were not SCIENTIFIC REGRET MINIMIZATION 21 Figure 6 . Age of Responsibility. Graphs demonstrate the differences in participants' judgments when deciding between a child and an old adult versus when deciding between a child and an adult versus an adult and an old adult. The dilemmas are roughly equivalent when the side with children are either crossing legally or when there is absence of a crossing signal, but not when they are crossing illegally. significant at the α = 0.05 level. Results are graphically represented in Figure 7 and reported in Supplementary Table S11 . 
Discussion
When there is so much data in front of us, where do we even start to look? This problem is not unique to large-scale experiments. Rather, it is the problem of the scientific enterprise in SCIENTIFIC REGRET MINIMIZATION 23 general. The scientific method has offered a solution: identify the signal in the data and iteratively critique hypotheses until they are able to explain as much of the signal as possible. In this paper, we formalized this idea as a loop in which we critique interpretable and theoretically-constrained psychological models with respect to a data-driven machine learning algorithm. Standard scientific techniques critique models with respect to the data, but once the dataset is sufficiently large, a purely data-driven machine learning algorithm like a neural network can often provide a better estimate of the true underlying function than the data itself.
We illustrated this methodology in the domain of moral decision-making. Psychological models of moral reasoning are often derived from consequentialist and deontological theories in moral philosophy (Kant, 1785; Bentham, 1789; Greene, 2007) , and these theories have been extremely fruitful in motivating moral psychology research. However, it is inevitable that a highly theoretically-driven scientific program will lead to incomplete models of human behavior. By contrasting these constrained models with data-driven models, we were able to identify shortcomings and use them to build a model that is both theoretically grounded and powerfully predictive. We found that incorporating axes of differences and their interactions with other deontological principles improved the accuracy of a rational choice model of moral decision-making. We then validated three of our findings by running independent preregistered experiments. In the remainder of the paper, we relate these findings to the moral reasoning literature and highlight the implications of our results.
Our results in Experiment 1 suggest that criminals are excluded from certain protections most humans are given, namely preferring to save them compared to dogs. These findings are consistent with a long line of work in sociology and psychology suggesting criminals are treated as a lower class of individuals than others in society when it comes to evaluating their status as a human being (Jahoda, 1999; Viki, Fullerton, Raggett, Tait, & Wiltshire, 2012; Bastian, Denson, & Haslam, 2013; Haslam & Loughnan, 2014) . Opotow et. al (Opotow, 1990) proposed that dehumanization is a form of moral exclusion in which a victim can lose their entitlement to compassion. Besides moral exclusion, other potential frameworks to understand participants' SCIENTIFIC REGRET MINIMIZATION 24 behavior may be through retributive justice (Darley & Pittman, 2003; Witvliet et al., 2008) and standard consequentialist reasoning. We believe both of these factors were also present in this paradigm, but that they were already taken into account in our choice model as the inferred weight given to criminals. The moral exclusion argument is supported by the fact that incorporating a humans-versus-animals principle was an important predictor of Moral Machine behavior, but that we had to specifically remove this label from situations that pitted criminals versus animals. Since these axes of differences were derived from the features of the agents , our modeling suggests that participants did not honor the 'human' feature for criminals.
The results from Experiment 2 suggest children are given a privileged status when assigning blame. The jurisprudential logic for the privileged status of children in the law is that children often lack the mens rea, i.e., the knowledge of wrongdoing and a necessary condition for criminal conviction, when partaking in illegal activity (Platt & Diamond, 1966; Dalby, 1985; Bandalli, 1998) . 1 Earlier, we proposed that the negative penalty associated with crossing illegally is justified by a consensual theory of punishment (Nino, 1983) , in which an individual waives their rights to being protected by the law when committing an illegal action. In our experiment, when the illegally crossing pedestrians were solely comprised of children, participants did not penalize them as much as when there was one adult. Formally, the jurisprudential logic behind participants' decisions here would be that the children did not have the necessary mens rea when crossing illegally and thus they did not willingly waive their rights to being protected by the law.
As a result, they should not be penalized as much as adults, who presumably did have the mens rea and thus knowingly waived their rights. Furthermore, the empirical effect is stronger when the car is on the side of the old adult, which is intuitive under the consensual theory of punishment framework as it seems more reasonable to excuse a child compared to an adult for not realizing they were crossing illegally when the car was on the opposite side.
The results in Experiment 3 demonstrated that when the car is headed towards the 1 An intuition for why mens rea is considered important is encapsulated by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.'s famous quip: "Even a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over and kicked." (Holmes, 1881) SCIENTIFIC REGRET MINIMIZATION 25 higher-valued individual and there is an absence of a crossing signal, they are treated half as if they are crossing legally and half as if they are crossing illegally. The same is not true when the car is headed towards the lower-valued individual. In those cases, the individual is treated in almost the same manner as when they are illegally crossing. One conjecture for this behavior is a form of motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990; Alicke, 2000; Ditto, Pizarro, & Tannenbaum, 2009 ).
Participants may have started off by assuming that the pedestrian in the same lane as the car is the one at fault. However, because the participant was motivated to save the higher-valued individual, they treated the absence of a crossing signal as an ambiguity that suggested equal probability of crossing legally or illegally. Conversely, when the car is headed towards the lower-valued individual, participants may have been motivated to infer that the individual was probably crossing illegally, and thus use the fact they are in front of the car to justify this belief.
The Moral Machine dataset proved to be a fruitful case study for Scientific Regret Minimization: rational choice models performed well, but we were still able to use a neural network to identify shortcomings once the dataset became sufficiently large. We expect that this methodology can be used in different domains, especially in mature fields (which may have unwittingly missed important systematic effects), but also in newer fields wherein the gaps between theoretically-inspired models and data-driven models remain large. Future work can extend our methodology in at least two different ways. The first is automating the identification and clustering of residuals into human-interpretable features. The second is that, while we assumed a specific functional form (i.e., a rational choice model) for the final model, it is plausible that this theoretical model is incorrect and thus we may need to develop a systematic way to identify the proper functional form itself.
On a broader note, we hope to further the development of a synergistic correspondence between psychology and data science approaches in scientific modeling (Rosenfeld, Zuckerman, Azaria, & Kraus, 2012; Dwyer, Falkai, & Koutsouleris, 2018; Bourgin, Peterson, Reichman, Griffiths, & Russell, 2019) . Cognitive science famously grew out of the intersection of six different fields (Gardner, 1987) , but some have suggested that this revolution did not create the SCIENTIFIC REGRET MINIMIZATION 26 emergence of a new discipline (Lakatos, 1986; Miller, 2003; Núñez et al., 2019) . Rather, research often proceeds independently in each contributing field. One potential reason for the lack of unification lies on a philosophical level: different scientific traditions have different epistemic values and are methodologically incommensurable (Kuhn, 1962) . For example, psychology prioritizes explanation while machine learning is almost exclusively focused on prediction, and their methodologies reflect these differences (Hofman, Sharma, & Watts, 2017; Yarkoni & Westfall, 2017) . To live up to promise of the cognitive revolution, we need to truly integrate the different values and methodologies implicit in these related fields. We hope the approach in this paper offers a step in that direction.
Methods
Mathematical Analysis and Simulations
The proof for the result in Equation 1 is below:
Empirical Results 2,086 participants across twelve conditions were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk and paid $0.50 to participate in an experiment in which they indicated their preferences in twenty-eight Moral Machine autonomous car dilemmas. The order of all twenty-eight dilemmas was randomized for each participant. Five of the twenty-eight dilemmas were attention checks. In the attention checks, participants had the option of either saving or killing everyone in the dilemma. If they chose to kill everyone more than once, they were excluded from further analysis.
The experiment's preregistration called for 163 participants per condition (twelve conditions for a total N = 1, 956) after the exclusion criteria were applied.
Nine of the remaining twenty-three dilemmas were passengers versus pedestrian dilemmas while fourteen were the stimuli for the hypotheses. The nine passengers versus pedestrian dilemmas were included to add variation because the fourteen stimuli used for the hypotheses were all pedestrian versus pedestrian dilemmas. Answers for these dilemmas were not analyzed.
Furthermore, both the nine passengers versus pedestrian dilemmas and five attention checks were kept constant across all twelve conditions.
Because there were a total twenty-four possible stimuli for each hypothesis, Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 3 stimuli were split into six groups of four and allocated throughout the twelve conditions such that each group was assigned to two conditions. Hypothesis 2 stimuli were split into four groups of six and allocated such that each group was assigned to three conditions. Thus, of the fourteen dilemmas participants saw for the hypotheses, four were for Hypothesis 1, six were for Hypothesis 2, and four were for Hypothesis 3. The end result was that all Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 3 stimuli received 326 judgments while all Hypothesis 2 stimuli received 489 judgments. These sample sizes were chosen in order to achieve 95% power at detecting a true effect using the Chi-squared proportion test at α = 0.05. Effect sizes were estimated using results from the Moral Machine dataset.
Experiments were coded using the jsPsych software package (De Leeuw, 2015) and the interface with Amazon Mechanical Turk was provided with psiTurk (Gureckis et al., 2016) . The SCIENTIFIC REGRET MINIMIZATION 29 dilemmas were created using the 'Design' feature on the Moral Machine website.
The hypotheses, experiments, and analyses were preregistered using the Open Science Framework at https://osf.io/25w3v/?view_only=b02f56f76f7648768ce3addd82f16abd. The data from the experiments and the analysis script for the figures in this paper are also uploaded there. Figure S1 . Two Moral Machine dilemmas that demonstrate an age gradient. Rational choice models treat these dilemmas equivalently, but the data indicated that participants do not do so when the side with children is illegally crossing. Results from Experiment 1 comparing the percentage of participants that save criminals versus dogs and the percentage of participants that save other humans versus dogs. We used a χ 2 analysis between the proportions, where N = 326 and df = 1. Old N/A 0.92 0.89 p = .061
Supplementary Material
Old Illegal 0.81 0.73 p = .001
Table S10
Results from Experiment 2 comparing the percentage of participants that save the young side with an adult versus the percentage of participants that save the young side without the adult. We used a χ 2 analysis between the proportions, where N = 489 and df = 1. Table S11
Results from Experiment 3 comparing the percentage of participants that save the higher-valued individual in the no crossing signal condition versus the mean of the percentages of participants saving the higher-valued individual in the other two crossing signal conditions. We used a χ 2 analysis between the proportions, in which N = 326 and df = 1.
